access to the outside (National Research Council Institute for Laboratory Ani mal Research, 2011) . The Guide states that thereby "animals can tum around and move freely without touching food or water troughs, have ready access to food and water, and have sufficient space to comfortably rest away from areas soiled by urine and feces" (p. 63). On 15 square feet, however, a pig cannot possibly exhibit normal behavior. No human of the same weight is expected to behave naturally in a o.gm 2 elevator and certainly not for a period of five years. Overall, this overview of the achievements of the 3Rs suggests that both in qualitative and in quantitative terms, adopting the 3Rs has not decreased animal suffering.
At the same time, societal demands for better protection of animals are more common than ever before (European Commission, 2016) . According to the most recent polls, citizens are increasingly concerned about the welfare of animals used in science and agree that more needs to be done to replace their use ( Clemence and Leaman, 2016; European Citizen's Initiative, 2016; Funk and Rainie, 2015; Jones, 2017 ) . Despite these demands and the reasonable doubts they cast on the potential of the 3Rs to lead to the ultimate replacement of ani mals in research ( see below), the 3Rs continue to be a popular policy tool for legislators and research facilities that use them as an example of their efforts to ameliorate the suffering of animals in research. The worldwide acceptance and simultaneous failure of the 3Rs seem to have turned the maxim, intention ally or not, into a means of whitewashing the images of those profiting from research vis-a-vis the public: scientists, research industries, and regulators. In light of these developments, this chapter takes a functional-comparative approach to scrutinize whether and how we can meet the rising societal de mands for replacement. It specifically examines whether the 3Rs bear the po tential of meeting this goal, and if so, what reforms are necessary, or whether the 3Rs should instead be abrogated.
propose a legislative act. The Stop Vivisection initiative demanded the use of animals for research purposes be abolished, which would have necessitated abrogating Directive 2010/63/EU (European Parliament, 2010 ) , and with it, the 3Rs. The EC responded to the initiative by issuing a communication that effectively ignored these demands, arguing that the Directive also had replace ment as a long-term goal, but that animal research cannot be banned because, "a ban [ ... ] would likely export the biomedical research and testing outside the Eu to countries where welfare standards may be lower and more animals may be needed to achieve the same scientific result" (European Commission, 2015, p. 3) . As an alternative to the proposed abrogation, the EC promised that it would speed up the expected progress of the 3Rs by sharing knowledge, de veloping and validating new alternatives, strengthening enforcement, and entering a dialogue with the scientific community, for example, by organiz ing a conference devoted to this issue ( see Holley et al., 2016 , on knowledge sharing in the EU). Undoubtedly, these steps may help to enforce Directive 2010/63/EU more effectively, but they do not respond to the criticism that the 3Rs suffer from structural deficits that lead to the perpetuation of ani mal use in science. In effect, the steps envisaged by the Commission, like the 3Rs as they stand, are unlikely to bring about the full replacement of animal models.
Given these economic fears and political constraints that continue to in form the debate on the replacement of animals in research, it may be more ef fective to use the worldwide acceptance of the 3Rs as a foundation for working towards a paradigm change, through a foot-in-the-door strategy. Theoretically, the 3Rs have many advantages over other types of regulatory approaches. They are simple and intelligible, easily understandable, and catchy. They en joy a general application, paired with refined conceptualization ( compared to the very general objective of avoiding unnecessary animal suffering that leaves even more room for interpretation). The 3Rs take an integrative ap proach by incentivizing innovation, accommodating the interests of various stakeholders, and not discrediting the purposes of research, such as finding causes, treatments, and cures for diseases or enabling novel scientific insights. The 3Rs consider the sentience and suffering of animals a baseline and re spond to the needs of animals beyond physiological suffering, such as their needs for social interaction and mental stimulation. Based on the h yp othesis that the 3Rs are theoretically expedient, it is worth exploring the potential of this principle to mature into a more viable concept for the future of animal law, in particular with regard to its capacity to preempt the use of animals in research. Most countries claim that a minimum number of animals should be used to obtain scientific knowledge, but the language of the replacement principle is regularly laxer than that of refinement. For example, in the EU, Directive 2010/63/EU determines that "Member States shall ensure that, wherever pos sible, a scientifically satisfactory method or testing strategy, not entailing the use of live non-human animals, shall be used instead of a procedure" ( emphasis added, European Parliament, 2010, Article 4). But given that the Directive fails to determine the probability of possible alternatives, how ac cessible they ought to be, and the need to invest into them, the norm fails to incentivize researchers to divest from animal research. According to Russell and Burch's ( 1959) definition of replace ment as "any scientific method employing non-sentient material" (Chapter 5) and fails to give those animals, whose capacity to sentience is still disputed, the benefit of the doubt ( challenging the view that non-human animals lower on the zoological scale lack sentience: Tomasik, 2014 ) . Such lax provisions give ample room for regulatees to avoid actual replacement, and they increase the possibility that certain research procedures may never be replaced. Given the lax practice in replacement and strong accentuation towards reduction and re finement, there seems to be an implicit hierarchical understanding of the 3Rs that gives refinement and reduction priority over replacement ( Gerritsen, 2015, p. 38) . The marginalization of replacement is especially disconcerting if one looks at the 3Rs from an "animal use" perspective, as seen in Table 6 .1.
It is this framework that allows animal researchers to discharge their du ties under the 3Rs by engaging in refinement (and marginal reduction) alone. The political and legal preoccupation with refinement and reduction shifts the focus away from where it should be, i.e., on replacement. So, if we continue to accept that legislators and institutions simply refine and marginally reduce the 
Refinement Reduction Replacement
Use of animals + + use of animal models-only replacing them "wherever practical" and thereby conceiving themselves as fulfilling their 3R duties-we will end up perpetuat ing the use of animals in experiments. Contrary to what many practice, the 3Rs ought, however, be interpreted to mandate that replacement be given primary consideration. As the above-mentioned polls show, citizens' opinions increas ingly pressure legislators to come up with a workable plan to phase out the use of animals in research, which necessitates insisting on the replacement of animals in research (see also Goldberg and Locke, 2004) . To bring about this paradigmatic change, the 3Rs should be understood hierarchically, where the first goal is replacement, the second reduction, and the third refinement. The imperative for this reversal is based on a historical, teleological, and evolution ary interpretation.
A historical interpretation of the 3Rs relies on Russell and Burch's founda tional work on the principle. Russell and Burch, the founders of the 3Rs, clearly stated that the humanitarian problem lies in the severity with which animals encounter stress and the high number of animals affected, and that the very purpose of the 3Rs is to tackle these (Russell and Burch, 1959, p. 93; Blattner, 2014) . Russell and Burch further stated that "refinement is never enough, and we should always seek further for reduction and if possible replacement" (Chapter 4). Because replacement does not appear to be a priority of the 3Rs even though it is an explicit goal of the tripartite principle, the law must give more weight to this element when it applies the principle in the future.
A teleological interpretation also suggests that the law must reverse the hier archy of the 3Rs. Indications of this interpretation already exist under current legislation. The polls introduced herein show that the global community has never been more concerned about animals' well-being than it is today. As a conse quence of this burgeoning global conscience, we are witnessing the rise of the general principle of animal welfare, which is developing into a norm of cus tomary international law (Bowman, Davies, and Redgwell, 2010, p. 678; Brels, 2012, p. 37; Sykes, 2014; Trent et al., 2005, p. 77 ) . International documents and the laws of over 60 states worldwide make clear the general moral commit ment and the legal requirement that animals be treated humanely and spared suffering (Blattner, 2016, pp. 304-308) . The general principle of animal welfare underlines the goal of animal protection as an intrinsic interest of animals. In other words, the suffering of animals matters to the law because it matters to animals (Bolliger, Richner, and Riittimann, 2011, p. 24-25, n. 14; Leondarakis, 2001, p. 29 ) . Importantly, the general principle of animal welfare not only man dates proper treatment of animals while using them; it also encompasses the aspiration of states to preempt any violation of their intrinsic interests.
Another global principle that requires regulatory frameworks to shift empha sis on animal replacement is the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle commonly applies in decision-making processes and entails that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent damage. The prime application of the precautionary principle is in en vironmental law where it covers animals who form an integral part of an eco system (Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987; United Nations, 1992, Article 8h, 14 (1) (7)). The precautionary principle demands that we err on the side of caution to prevent dangerous effects on animal health, replacing ani mals in research rather than regulating and, thus, perpetuating their use by refinement and reduction. We must thus decide in favor of animals wherever and whenever actions impair, or likely will impair, their physical and psycho logical health and life ( Gerick, 2005, p. 213; Kuhlau et al., 2011 ). An evolution ary interpretation, based on the general principle of animal welfare and the precautionary principle therefore indicates that replacement should be given primary consideration among the 3Rs.
Reform Proposal 2: Qualitative Balances of Interests, Harm-Benefit Analyses, and Proportionality Tests
Even if replacement is given absolute preference, the 3Rs are still likely to fail because in most jurisdictions they enjoy only relative validity. Researchers do not refine the conditions of animals, do not reduce the number of animals used, and do not replace animals as the primary research model ( even where alternatives exist) if human interests justify that decision. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act 2005, for example, states that "[p ]ain, suffering or harm may be inflicted on or anxiety caused to a non-human animal only if this is unavoid able for the purpose of the experiment" (Article 20 (1)). The issue here is that the purpose of the experiment is the only determinant in deciding whether animal suffering is unavoidable, or so-called necessary. The suffering inflict ed on animals during experimentation is seen as a prima facie harm, but its justifiability-and hence its legality-is fully determined by the purpose of the experiment. Animals' interests in not suffering, by contrast, do not enter the judgment on necessity.
The Swiss Animal Welfare Act seems to have taken a step in the right direc tion by further providing that animal experimentation is impermissible "if, in relation to the anticipated gain in knowledge, it inflicts disproportionate pain, suffering or harm [on the animal]" (emphasis added, Article 19(4)). Similar ly, under the United Kingdom's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, the Animals in Science Regulation Unit will assess whether the harms caused by an experiment are '1ustified by the expected outcome" ( emphasis added, Section 5B(3)(d)). This is also the case with Article 38(1)(b) of Directive/2010/63/EU (European Parliament, 2010 ) . These and other laws claim that they determine the legality of an experiment conducted on animals not only by evaluating the necessity of an experiment but by weighing all interests at hand. Such norms bring to application what is sometimes known as the balance of interest tests, harm-benefit analyses, or the proportionality principle.
Pursuant to these tests, animal experiments are evaluated in a two-step pro cedure. Regulators require the purpose of an experiment to be indispensable (final indispensability), and they require the means to achieve this end to be indispensable ( instrumental indispensability or harm-benefit analysis) (Pe ters, 2012, p. 1)(2)). The proportionality analysis includes the elements of suitability (means must be able to achieve desired ends), necessity (no milder means are available to achieve the end), and proportionality strictusensu (Bol liger and Riittimann, 2015, pp. 71-73) . This final proportionality, strictu sensu evaluation includes a duty to diligently balance interests affected by the act at hand and conforms to the harm-benefit analysis (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, p. 140) but with respect to means as opposed to ends.
Let us tum to final indispensability first. Before weighing interests, decision making bodies usually follow a system that classifies expected harms inf licted on animals. For example, there is a five-step classification system in Canada (Canadian Council on Animal Care, 20n), in New Zealand (New Zea land Government, 2010, Section 2(1)), and in Israel (Kolman et al., 2014, pp. 202-203) , a four-tiered scheme in Singapore (National Advisory Committee for Laboratory Animal Research, 2004, Article 5(4)(2)(b)) and the EU (European Parliament, 2010, Articles 15 and 16); and the Philippines has a three-step pain categorization system (Philippines Law on the Use of Animals in Research, 1999, Article 5( 2) ). Most of these classification schemes determine harm or pain lev els based on the severity of a procedure or its duration, or a combination of the two. Article 15 of Directive 2010/63/EU, for example, assesses projects as non recovery, mild (short-term mild pain, suffering, or distress), moderate (short term moderate or long-lasting mild pain, suffering, or distress), and severe (severe or long-lasting moderate pain, suffering, or distress) (European Parlia ment, 2010 ). To best evaluate harm, psychological spheres of animals must also be considered because inducing fe ar or anxiety in an animal negatively affects their well-being ( e.g., Council of Europe, 1979, preamble; Swiss Animal Welfare Act, 2005 , Article 3(b )( 4) ).
In contrast to harms, benefits are neither classified nor categorized. For instance, in the UK, where stricter harm-benefit analyses are said to prevail (Perry, 2007, p. 43) , benefits are described in a very broad manner, by answering questions such as, what data or products may be acquired by the work, what scientific questions will be answered, what knowledge gaps will be filled, who will benefit from the work, and how and when the benefits will accrue. Quite telling in this respect is the need for scientists to "[ e ]xplain why the benefits go beyond 'it would be nice to know ( 2 )(5) ). Though these rules on final indispensability serve an important purpose and help prevent the most unnecessary and atrocious research procedures, they effectively leave untouched the great bulk of research. For example, the societal objectives of curing diseases or producing new scientific knowledge typically operate as a carte blanche that legitimate every form of animal ex ploitation and give the 3Rs only relative validity. But simply dropping the words cancer research cannot and should not automatically justify the use of animals. We must introduce a scheme that evaluates the importance of the research, its contribution to the expected goal, and the likelihood of its suc cess; and we must be wary of approving research projects that simply ensure a research facility's survival and the preservation of jobs, while perpetuating the exploitation of animals (arguing that "[c]onducting animal experiments is a convenient and highly effective way for these researchers to gain career prestige and job security, and for the universities who employ them to obtain lucrative research grants. There is a quid pro quo relationship between research institutions and those giving the grants", Greek and Greek, 2004, p.25) . No research that goes beyond "it would be nice to know" is, by itself, morally or legally weighty enough to justify the immense suffering of animals in research. Peters (2015) proposes categorizing human interests into small, moderate, and great benefits to introduce a level field for evaluating human benefits versus animal harms (p. 97 ). Having precise knowledge about both burdens and benefits allows us to weigh more systematically the importance of the in terests at hand, and makes it more obvious when marginal scientific interests Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne -978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0BPM via free access seek to trump animals' fundamental interests in life and bodily and mental integrity.
A further failing within harm-benefit evaluations is that the tests are regu larly affected by referring to the legal tools that encapsulate those interests, rather than by the interests themselves. Scholars and individuals around the world have frequently exposed the risks of endowing humans with rights, while endowing animals only with protections. When experiments are evalu ated, rights of humans, such as the freedom of research ( e.g., Council of Eu rope, 1950, Article 10) or the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work ( e.g., European Convention, 2000, Article 15), are juxtaposed against (animal) protections ( e.g., the 3Rs ). The fact that certain interests are legally recognized either as rights or as protections, establishes a disparate and unequal footing for the affected parties. Protections are effectively un dermined when confronted with rights in a balance of interests, because they are a weaker legal tool. Consequently, protections only take effect where the rights of humans leave room for them. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005) is a prime example of this automatic trumping. It requires anyone who handles animals to ensure their well-being "as far as the intended purpose allows" (Article 4(1)(b)). This not only renders research quintessentially a utilitarian endeavor; but, more notably, it creates a structural deficit to the detriment of animals. The balance of interests ends up being merely perfunctory and legitimizes, in essence rubber-stamps, the exploitation of animals (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, p. 140; Gerritsen, 2015, p. 38) .
A prime example of the inherent deficiency created by rights versus protec tion is the German state objective of animal protection. Prior to the amend ment of Article 20a of German Basic Law, scholars viewed the German Basic Law as a "constant obstacle" (Evans, p. 326) to the effective protection of animals and were hopeful that the constitutionalization of animal protection, even if it would not create justiciable rights, would put animal protection on par with constitutional rights, as regards governmental value judgments ( Gerick, 2005, p. 120 ) . Judiciary practice established since the norm's amendment in 2002, however, shows that the state objective is regularly subordinated to con stitutional rights ( German Administrative Court, 2006; German Constitutional Court, 2009; German Constitutional Court, 2006 ; see further Eisen and Stilt, 2017, note 25) . The deficiency again is that the balances of interests do not even examine the interests that underlie legal tools. They fail, for example, to acknowledge that what we may be balancing are interests in not being tor tured versus interests in making economic profit. Instead, these tests balance interests only with reference to legal tools that protect those interests ( rights versus protections )-a practice that structurally favors all human interests in using animals, over all interests of animals in not being used. The first step towards ensuring a less biased balance of interests is to clearly differentiate between a scientific evaluation of whether animals are required to obtain a scientific result, and an ethical evaluation of whether it is morally justifiable in each individual case to inflict a certain kind of suffering upon an animal for a certain kind of desired objective. The second step to reforming these tests is leveling the position of competing interests, by establishing a reli able framework for a qualitative and non-speciesist balance of interests. Such a qualitative balance of interests demands that identical interests be viewed identically, regardless of the holder of the interest, i.e., be it the interests of hu mans or the interests of animals (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, p. 139; Robertson, 2015, p. 102 ) . Balancing qualities of the interests at stake should, in principle, prevent marginal research interests from trumping interests in bodily integrity.
5
Reform Proposal 3: Animal Rights
Why Reverse Hierarchies and Up graded Balances of Interests Do No t Suffice
Even if replacement is considered the primary aim of the 3Rs, and even if we considerably revamp the balance of interests test, the 3Rs will likely continue to fail. The odds against this test are so high because its logic is flawed. The golden standard in animal experimentation is the animal model. The animal model poses ethical problems, has never been validated as a research method, and is strongly criticized for lacking sufficient predictive value to draw inferences about human models ( e.g., Baker, 2016; Bailey, Thew and Balls, 2014; Greek and Menache, 2013; Knight, 2011; Mcivor, 2019 , Chapter 5 in this Volume). Despite these apparent flaws and the structural deficiencies of the animal model, under the 3Rs, a non-animal model not only needs to be as "effective" as the animal model, but ( unlike the animal model) it actually needs to work. As Greek points out, this means we are " [w] aiting to abandon a test that does not work until we can find one that does" (Greek, 2015) . A recently published report by the Scien tific Committee on Health Environmental and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) on the need for non-human primates in research even posits that alternative models, which are to be validated against existing animal models, will require-from a legal perspective-using more animals in the validation process (SCHEER, 2017, pp. 20, 56) . The odds are thus high that the 3Rs will perpetuate the use of animals in research. A final and crucial lex ferenda change that may overturn this deeply ingrained imbalance requires restructuring protections as rights.
. 2
Prohibitions as Rights? Some scholars argue that animals already have at least some rights by arguing that prohibitions are negative freedom rights of animals. Section 85 paragraph 1 (1)). From the general prohibition on using hominids for research, testing, or teaching, some infer that hominids have the right not to be infringed in their life and bodily and mental integrity. Wagman and Liebman (2011) , for example, argue that "the ban on certain conduct seems to grant the affected animals the 'right' to be free of such conduct. Because of animals' status as property in every juris diction, those rights are naturally limited" (pp. 261; see also McCausland, 2014, p. 27; Robertson, 2015, pp. 3, 5; Sunstein, 2004, p. 99; Waldau, 2011 ).
If we look at the laws that regulate research on animals, there are several prohibitions that could be posited as negative freedom rights. According to Article 8 (2) and (3) (National Health and Medical Research Council, 2003) , which declares that research on great apes is legal under narrow conditions, is also sometimes considered to enshrine a freedom right of great apes to not be used in research. Similar prohibitions/ rights exist in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and other states ( Goldner, 2014 ) . Another type of negative freedom right can be seen in the EU-wide prohibition of experiments that result in severe pain, suf fering, or distress for animals and which are likely to be long-lasting (European Parliament, 2010, Article 15(2) ). However, these prohibitions are undermined when Member States choose to allow such procedures temporarily (Europe an Parliament, 2010, Article 55 (2)-(3)). Member states may, however, decline to adopt exceptions, which scholars support by arguing that certain levels of suffering should not be permitted under any circumstances, regardless of any likely or aspired benefits (Zurlo, Rudacille and Goldberg, 1996) . Another type of prohibition is the ban on subjecting vertebrates to research without anes thesia when experiments result in serious injuries (European Parliament, 2010 1 Article 14(1), Sentence 2). Prohibitions may also preclude certain purposes from justifying animal use in research. Under Puerto Rican law, for example, animal experiments are prohibited if they are done for educational purposes ( e.g., Puerto Rico Animal Welfare Act, 2008, Article 19(b ) ; see also Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance, 2008, Article 138( 2) ).
Prohibitions are a major step forward for animals, making certain spe cies of animals unavailable to human disposition. In this sense, prohibitions Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne -978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0BPM via free access effectively preempt balances of interests: None of the specified procedures are prima facie available to be overridden by human interests. But these pro hibitions apply only to a minority of animals ( e.g., to iconic or endangered animals) and continue to be undermined by broad exceptions, which in tum promote the continuing use of a majority of animals in research.
5.3
The Ne ed fo r Animal Rights The whole idea that the duties of some can be translated into the rights of others (to whom the duty is owed); and, thus, that prohibitions are negative freedom rights of animals, is disputed in legal scholarship ( Curnutt, 2001, pp. 19ff., 26ff.; Raspe, 2013, p. 282 ) . Contrary to Wagman and Liebman's perspec tive is the view that specified norms are prohibitions, no more, no less. Rights are only established by unequivocally identifying them as such ( e.g., "hominids have a right to life and a right to bodily and mental integrity"). Instead of opt ing for limited prohibitions that are undermined by numerous and sweeping exceptions, the only way to begin attending to the fundamental interests of animals is to establish rights for them. Rights are those rare tools that ensure that interests are qualitatively balanced, and that the balance is egalitarian and non-speciesist. As Peters ( 2016) argues: "[ A ]nimal rights would allow a fair bal ancing in which the proper value of fundamental animal interests ( such as the interest to live) could be integrated. Animal rights would therefore preclude the current routine sacrifice of fundamental animal interests in favor of trite human interests" (p. 49 ). The demand for fundamental rights for animals is neither utopian nor far-fetched; it is the only option available to move away from our prevailing perfunctory consideration of animals. Particularly in re search, where balance of interest tests prevail, establishing rights for animals is indispensable if we seriously want to start envisaging an end to their use in experimentation.
Another notable aspect about rights is that they ensure that rights holders have a sphere of absolute unavailability. In human rights law, this is known as the very substance of a right that may not be restricted or impaired in any way (e.g., European Economic Community, 1957, Article 2; Swiss Constitution, 1999, Article 36(4)). Because animals, under the laws of most states, are de nied rights, human interests in exploiting animals take categorical precedence over their most fundamental interests, such as life and freedom. Introducing a sphere of inviolability for the most fundamental interests that animals pos sess is necessary, if we want to truly take their interests seriously and live up to our recognition of their intrinsic value (Peters, 2015, p. 72) . A number of laws already recognize that the interests of animals matter because these interests nimal users are to be aware of the value oflife of animals" (Principle 1), and that "animal users need to be aware that animals are living beings just as humans are living beings" (Principle 4). The recognition of the intrinsic value of animals is not only ethically relevant, but it carries legal implications (Peters, 2015, p. 70) and should result in rights that protect these individuals' core inter ests. Recent case law in India shows that animal rights are on the rise and that they are readily implementable. The High Court of Kerala (2000) declared: "[L] egal rights shall not be the exclusive preserve of the humans which has to be extended beyond people thereby dismantling the thick legal wall with humans all on one side and all animals on the other side" (N.R. Nair and Ors v. Union of India (um) and Ors, 2000 ); and, "animals are born with an equal claim for life without any cruelty to them. Perhaps if this right was given proper recogni tion by the human-beings, there would have been no necessity to bring on the statute book of the said Act" (People for Animals and Ors. v. State of Goa and Ors, 1997) . Establishing rights, and thereby an essence of inviolability, has a number of implications. Akin to Principle 5 of the Nu remberg Code (1949) , experi ments will not be conducted, "where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur" because it violates the core content of a right to life and bodily and mental integrity. And analogous to Principle 8 of the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013) , the primary pur pose of medical research to generate new knowledge cannot take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects. Today, the duty to rehabilitate animals-sometimes known as the fourth R-could be taken as a useful starting point in this respect. Recital 14 of Directive 2010/63/EU states that methods should avoid death ( of animals) as an endpoint. Killing an animal used for a research experiment is only permitted if they remain in or have recurrent moderate or severe pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm (European Parliament, 2010, Article 17( 2 ) ; Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6) . Article 17 paragraph 3 of Directive 2010/63/EU further states: "Where an animal is to be kept alive, it shall receive care and accommodation appropriate to its state of health." India's Guidelines on the Regulation of Scientific Experiments on Animals determine that "investi gators are responsible for the aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals after experimentation" ( Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6) . If states tod ay are willing to determine that death of animals used in research should be avoided, it is not unreasonable to consider the pos sibility that they will grant animals a right to life in the future. Thereby, the rehoming duty would be explicitly reframed as a manifestation of a right to life, akin to Principle 5 of the Nuremberg Code (1949) . A deficiency of current rehoming provisions, however, is that researchers are nudged to use the meth od that causes lasting moderate and severe pain, so they can put the animal down without having to care for or accommodate them after the conclusion of the experiment. To counter these unwarranted disincentives, the costs of aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals post-experimentation should be budgeted as a part of research costs when an application is filed ( as required by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6, Principle 4).
5.4
A Pa radigm Shift? Animal rights implemented in law would create a paradigm shift because they offer specific advantages over protections. Instead of merely establish ing specific and context-dependent prohibitions, rights operate more broadly and are less determinate. This confers advantages to the rights holder, because rights are applicable in a myriad of situations. For example, a right to bodi ly and mental integrity applies to the general question of whether use of an animal in research is justified. If the answer is yes, then the question must be asked whether and how this right can be guaranteed in research ( e.g., by car rying out research that does not inflict any form of suffering, including death). Moreover, animals are empowered by rights because they, by being actionable, grant them access to stronger legal tools of enforcement (Edmundson, 2014 1 pp. 345ff., 350; Goldner, 2014, p. 53ff.) . Only the enforced duty of others to re spect the right in question renders its worthiness palpable (Edmundson, 2014, p. 360 ) . Establishing a right of animals to life and bodily and mental integrity would stop perpetuating the use of animals for research and enable us to achi eve the primary goal of the 3Rs: the ultimate replacement of animal models.
While funding animal-free alternatives will undoubtedly contribute to this goal, as well (see e.g., Swiss Animal Welfare Act, Article 22(2); European Par liament, 2010, Recital 46), only a paradigm change in the law of animals in research will stop incentivizing research facilities to continue experiment ing on animals and will start enabling them to put all their efforts into find ing ethically sound (and more scientifically sound) alternatives to the use of animals.
If industries cannot now devise alternatives to animal models, then certain types of research procedures simply should not be carried out until we find alternatives. When the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013) came into force, legislators deemed acceptable the burden of looking for al ternative models to research on humans. The same change of research pro cedure is, on the basis of a non-speciesist ethic, reasonable to demand from industries that currently rely on animal models. This route is not utopian but was taken by lawmakers before, such as when the Eu decided to give full ef fect to the Cosmetics Directive (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). When dis cussing the potential postponement of the 2013 marketing ban on cosmetics, since replacement methods for all animal models were not yet available, the EC argued that postponing the ban would "diminish determination to swiftly develop alternative test methods. Past experience demonstrates clearly that animal testing provisions in the cosmetics legislation have been a key accel erator in relation to the development of alternative methods and have sent a strong signal far beyond the cosmetics sector and far beyond Europe" (Eu ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6). Instead of conceiving rights for animals as a scientific regression, industries will be incentivized to finally spur innovation towards ethically sound and economically accessible alternatives.
The Eu Cosmetics Directive has had a positive spill-over effect into other ar eas of animal experimentation, alongside further national bans on cosmetics testing, including Australia (Australian Government, Department of Health, (NCad, 2016) to plan a schedule that phases out experiments on animals (which applies to all of the above areas). NCad clearly puts emphasis on innovation and the development of new research methods rather than the abrogation of animal research; yet, its move is historical and will hopefully set a precedent for other states to follow. These developments show that the un availability of animals for research does not equate with an end to research and advances for human benefit but instead, it heralds the beginning of an ethically and scientifically sound future for research. If devised as rights in stead of bans, these regulatory changes would create more secure and justicia ble ground for animals and could enable us to work more effectively towards a paradigm change in research.
Concluding Remarks
The 3Rs are a primary example of regulatory failure, and yet the concept enjoys an unparalleled acceptance among states and research institutions worldwide. Instead of abrogating the 3Rs (which is demanded by a grow ing number of citizens), it would be better to leverage the 3Rs' widespread acceptance to enable regulators to fulfil their unachieved regulatory goals and meet the growing demands of citizens for a more just relationship with animals. This chapter proposed means of bringing about paradigm change, that, al though few, are powerful. First, regulators must reverse the hierarchy of the 3Rs, based on a historical, teleological, and evolutionary interpretation, with replacement taking precedence. Second, regulators must introduce qualitative balances of interests, so identical interests are viewed identically, regardless of the interest holder. As a result, marginal scientific or prestige interests cannot trump interests in life and bodily and mental integrity. Third, animals must be accorded explicit rights to life and bodily and mental integrity, based on our legal commitment to protect them for their own sake (intrinsic animal pro tection), for the following reasons: rights grant more power to rights holders than interests do to interest holders, rights require special justification, give effective weight to animal interests in balancing tests, make the core interests of animals inviolable to human exploitation, and operate broadl y. Although Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne -978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0BPM via free access rights will preclude undertaking many research practices that are currently conducted on animals, they spur innovation and help make research more ef fective and accessible. As the EC (2013) stated with respect to cosmetics, "the possible risks from the 2013 marketing ban can be turned into an opportunity for the Union to set an example of responsible innovation [ ... ] with positive impact beyond Europe" (p. 6). The very same opportunities are available to us in research more generally if we begin to embark on a road of innovation and progress. If these adjustments are incorporated, we anticipate that the 3Rs can of fer a valuable approach to overturning the deeply ingrained default rule of animal experimentation and to incrementally phase out the use of animals in research. But "[f]ully reaping the potential of alternative methods is a challenging endeavor that will require a shift in thinking of all involved" (Eu ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6; inertia of continued animal use is acknowl edged in Innovate UK, 2015, p. 14) . Legislators must empower scientists and research institutions to take the full replacement road by designing the best possible legal framework for it and by giving them the necessary financial in centives and education to pursue replacement, instead of holding them mor ally responsible for the continued use of animals, which is in fact a regulatory failure.
